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Abstract
Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind many years of lending practice and a
large body of theory in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard.
Using a simple referral incentive mechanism under individual liability, we develop and imple-
ment a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and
enforcement effects. We allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex-ante repayment type and
ex-post susceptibility to social pressure. Our key contribution is how we deal with the interac-
tion between these two sources of asymmetric information. Our method allows us to identify
selection on the likelihood of repayment, selection on the susceptibility to social pressure, and
loan enforcement. We estimate peer effects on loan repayment in our setting, and find no evi-
dence of screening (albeit with an imprecisely estimated zero) and large effects on enforcement.
We then discuss the potential utility and portability of the methodological innovation, for both
science and for practice.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory assigns credit market failure a central role in explaining poverty and underde-
velopment. Borrowing constraints reduce efficiency, increase inequality and can lead to poverty
traps (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). Credit rationing also appears to be
empirically important. Making use of experimental or quasi-experimental supply shocks, several
recent papers estimate a large unmet demand for additional credit from consumers, microenter-
prises and small and medium enterprises.1 These studies, coupled with a literature that often
finds high returns to capital (e.g., De Mel et al. 2008), lend credence to policy and programmatic
efforts to relax borrowing constraints.
But how should one go about relaxing borrowing constraints? Information asymmetries, in-
cluding ex-ante selection and ex-post incentive and enforcement problems, are often invoked as
the root causes of borrowing constraints in theory (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and practice (Ar-
menda´riz et al. 2010). If this is indeed the case, contracts that alleviate asymmetric information
problems provide a route to greater credit market efficiency.
One popular approach to tackling asymmetric information is based on the presumption that
a borrower’s peers can be harnessed to provide information/screening or enforcement that is
unavailable to (or more costly for) the lender.2 Peer-intermediation has been fleshed out over
several hundred years of lending practice and can be seen in a range of guises including credit
cooperatives, credit unions, rotating savings and credit associations, and microlenders such as
the Grameen Bank. Peer intermediation has also been analyzed in a large theoretical literature on
optimal mechanism design in the face of different asymmetric information problems (e.g., Varian
1990, Stiglitz 1990, Banerjee et al. 1994, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999, Ghatak and Guinnane
1999, Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m 2004, and Bond and Rai 2008).
Empirical work on peer contracting has, however, lagged behind both theory and practice.
Yet we need empirical tests of theories not just to inform and build on our theoretical models
of credit markets, but for practical concerns to inform policy. Specifically, with more precise
information on the absolute and relative importance and leverage of screening and enforcement,
one can design better contracts that improve credit market efficiency. For example, if peers are
able to provide high quality screening but weak enforcement, a mechanism that uses joint liability
to select clients for a first loan but then moves to individual liability would harness much of the
screening incentive – a´ la Ghatak (1999) – but minimise the possible negatives of joint liability
lending such as tipping into strategic default (Besley and Coate 1995) and sub-optimal risk-taking
(Fischer 2010 and Gine´ et al. 2011). But if enforcement is largely responsible for the success of
peer schemes, then the appropriateness of peer mechanisms will decrease as ex-post enforcement
is strengthened through debt collection, legal remedies or better verification of identities.
We formalize and implement a field experiment design that separately identifies peer screen-
1For consumers see e.g., Karlan and Zinman (2010) for microenterprises see e.g., Banerjee (2013) and the references
therein, and for SMEs see e.g., Banerjee and Duflo (2004).
2Throughout the paper we use the term enforcement to refer to a set of actions that might include monitoring, peer
pressure, mutual insurance or direct peer assistance.
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ing and peer enforcement effects under weaker assumptions than previous work on asymmetric
information. Our key innovations concern the interaction between hidden information and hid-
den action. Our framework allows borrowers to differ both with respect to their ability to repay
(their repayment type) and their susceptibility to social pressure (their malleability type). Hetero-
geneity with respect to malleability raises the possibility of selection on malleability – that peers
select based on their ability to enforce repayment – as well as the possibility that repayment type
is correlated with malleability type. We show that these issues complicate the identification of
selection on repayment type – the type of selection usually associated with peer mechanisms fol-
lowing Ghatak (1999) – but that our experimental design overcomes these difficulties. The possi-
bility that estimates of the extent of hidden information (that can be remedied by peer screening)
depend on the extent of hidden action effects (that can be remedied by enforcement) occurs in
many contract design settings. Relative to other papers that have attempted to separate selection
and enforcement in a variety of settings (e.g. Karlan and Zinman 2009 and Einav et al. 2013)
our experimental design allows us to identify selection without having to assume a zero corre-
lation between ex-ante type and ex-post responsiveness to incentives. Estimates of the extent of
selection on malleability are also important for contract design. Positive selection on malleability
implies that the success of peer enforcement will depend on the amount of selection induced by
the contract. Further, under some reasonable assumptions, selection on repayment type and se-
lection on malleability will be substitutes, opening up the possibility that the extent of selection
on repayment type will be determined by the lender’s choice of enforcement technology.
Since theory, practice, and empirical work all suggest that information environments and the
effectiveness of different remedies will vary across settings,3 our experiment is designed to be
portable: simple, and low-cost, to implement in different settings. The hope is that that this will
allow the experiment to be used to tailor contract design to the specifics of particular markets. We
demonstrate the experiment in one setting in conjunction with Opportunity Finance South Africa
(“Opportunity”), a consumer lender located in Kwazulu Natal and a member of the Opportunity
International microfinance network.
Opportunity offered existing clients a 100 Rand ($12) bonus for referring a new borrower who
met particular criteria for Opportunity’s individual liability loan. Opportunity first randomly di-
vided referrers into one of two ex-ante (prior to referral being made) incentives: referrers in the
ex-ante approval group were told that they would receive the bonus if the person they referred
was approved for a loan. Referrers in the ex-ante repayment group were told that they would
receive the bonus if the person they referred repaid a loan on time. Referrers in the ex-ante re-
payment treatment had both an ex-ante incentive to refer applicants of good credit quality (both
observable and unobservable to Opportunity), and an ex-post incentive to encourage repayment.
Referrers in the ex-ante approval group only had an incentive to refer someone they thought
would be approved for a loan.
Ex-post (i.e. after the referral had been made), Opportunity randomly surprised some referrers
3E.g., Besley and Coate (1995) predicts that the success of peer lending will depend on the strength of “social collateral”
in the community. For empirical evidence compare Gine´ and Karlan (2010) with Carpena et al. (2010).
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whose referred applications had been approved with an improvement to their bonus contract.4
Half of the referrers with the ex-ante repayment incentive were given their bonuses as soon as the
loan was approved, thus removing the enforcement incentive. Half of referrers given the ex-ante
approval incentive were offered an additional bonus if the referred loan was repaid, thus creating
an enforcement incentive. Thus, within each of the ex-ante groups, half the referrers have an
ex-post repayment incentive and half have an ex-post approval incentive.5
The design produces four groups of referrers, each with a different combination of ex-ante and
ex-post incentives, as illustrated in Figure 1. Throughout we denote the ex-ante treatment group
(i.e. what the referrer was promised prior to making the referral) with a lower case letter and the
ex-post treatment group (i.e. what the referrer was given after making the referral) with a capital
letter. So someone in group aR was promised an approval incentive, but also given a repayment
bonus.
In Section 4 we provide a formal model of the referral decision and use it to show how the
design can separate peer enforcement from selection on repayment type and selection on mal-
leability. Intuitively, enforcement is measured by comparing repayment rates in different rows
and selection by comparing repayment rates across columns. But selection on what? Two addi-
tional comparisons permit separate identification of selection on repayment type and selection on
enforcement malleability. First, comparing repayment rates across columns only in the top row
measures selection in the absence of an enforcement incentive. This comparison reveals the extent
of selection on repayment type even if repayment type and malleability are correlated. Second,
the design produces two estimates of the size of the enforcement effect, one with a selection in-
centive (comparing rows conditional on being in the right column) and one without (comparing
rows conditional on being in the left column). Comparing these two estimates gives us a measure
of selection on malleability.
We also show when our experiment can determine whether or not referrers have information
about repayment type. This is a slightly more general question – rather than asking whether the
experiment induced selection, we ask whether the group of referrers has information. (Referrers
might have information but not reveal it if our mechanism was ineffective.) Guided by an exten-
sion to our model (Appendix B), we show in the empirical section that our repayment incentive
induced referrers to substitute away from referring family toward referring friends. If this sub-
stitution increases the cost of making the referral, and selection on malleability is not too strong,
then we can infer that referrers at least attempted to refer high repayment types. If this attempt
was unsuccessful– if we find no evidence of selection on repayment type– we infer that referrers
have a (noisy) belief that they have information about repayment type, but that in practice this
information was already captured by the lender.
Results from our demonstration show strong enforcement effects. By comparing repayment
rates across ex-post incentives holding the ex-ante incentive constant, we find that the small bonus
4Lenders frequently contact borrowers with promotions in this market.
5The lender also contacted those referrers for whom the contract was not changed and reminded them of the existence
of the contract. This was to dampen any attention or signalling effects.
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Figure 1: 2 × 2 Experimental Design – Repayment Incentives
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Bonus given can differ from bonus promised because, after offering the initial bonus ex-ante (prior to the referral), the
lender later calls each referrer ex-post (after the referral is made) and randomly pleasantly surprises those in the aR and
rA cells with a change to their incentives. Incentives refer to repayment incentives. All referrers have an incentive to refer
a friend that will be approved for a loan.
(100 Rand is equal to about 2% of the average referrer’s gross monthly income and 3% of the aver-
age loan size) decreased default from around 20% to 10% in most specifications.6 The magnitude
of improvement in repayment performance is far above and beyond what referrers and borrow-
ers could accomplish with side-contracting, and the improvement (and savings in collection costs)
far exceeded the lender’s outlays for bonuses. Indeed, the lender continues to use the repayment
incentive referral post-experiment.7
We do not find strong evidence of selection effects. Comparing repayment rates across ex-
ante incentives, holding the ex-post incentive fixed, we find no evidence that peer selection on
repayment type improved repayment, although this is an imprecise zero. Finally, we are unable to
reject that there is no selection on malleability in our setting, although this is again an imprecisely
estimated zero with confidence intervals that contain economically meaningful selection effects.
We make four main contributions relative to the existing literature. First, our experiment in-
troduces peer influence in a simple individual liability setting where there is limited potential for
complicating strategic interactions.8 This makes identification possible under plausibly weaker
assumptions than required in joint liability settings.9 Second, we use a two-stage experiment to
6The emphasis of this paper is on designing contracts that encourage repayment so that the lender can relax borrowing
constraints. From this perspective the lower default rate is positive. However, it is plausible that overall welfare is
decreased if the social pressure is excessive. So we do not attach a welfare interpretation to any of our results.
7Besides the enforcement effect, another benefit for the lender is that referrers select on observables: referred borrowers
are much more likely to be approved for a loan (55%) than non-referred borrowers (23%).
8See also Klonner and Rai (2010), which finds in a non-experimental setting that co-signers improve repayment per-
formance in “organized” (intermediated) rotating savings and credit associations.
9For example, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) identifies selection effects only under the assumption that their model
correctly captures the strategic situation.
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identify selection and enforcement separately, in a peer referral environment.10 The portability
of the experimental design can help build evidence across settings and contexts. Theory predicts
that peer intermediation will have effects that vary with, e.g., the lenders’ ability to screen and
enforce, the social environment and the heterogeneity of returns. Tests using this experimental
design across such settings can help build a robust and empirically-validated theoretical frame-
work. Third, as discussed above, we advance the study of selection on moral hazard by develop-
ing a treatment in which there is no enforcement incentive.11 Fourth, we provide evidence on the
extent of selection and enforcement effects in a particular setting, and highlight the potential for
peer referral contracts to work in practice.
The paper also provides additional evidence on the presence of asymmetric information prob-
lems in developing-country credit markets. Our enforcement results imply the existence of moral
hazard, similar to the results in Karlan and Zinman (2009), Gine´ et al. (2012), De Janvry et al.
(2010) and Karlan et al. (2012). Our lack of a strong screening result -may- imply that there is little
adverse selection in the market, again similar to findings in the existing literature. However, we
emphasize that there are alternative interpretations for this null result. Our confidence intervals
include economically meaningful selection effects. It could also be that there is in fact selection
on hidden information, but that peers do not have any better access to this hidden information
than the lender.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Opportunity and the
South African microloan market. Section 3 provides details of the experiment. Section 4 outlines
a simple model of the referrer’s decision process, highlighting the conditions under which our
experiment separately identifies enforcement and selection. Section 5 provides some summary
statistics and discusses the integrity of the randomization. Section 6 provides our main results.
Section 7 discusses a few alternative explanations of the data and Section 8 concludes.
2 Market and Lender Overview
Our cooperating lender is a new entrant to the South African consumer microloan market. Oppor-
tunity Finance South Africa (Opportunity) is a for-profit, wholly-owned subsidiary of Opportu-
nity International, which has 1.26 million micro-loan customers across 24 different countries. Op-
portunity operates in the state of Kwazulu Natal, South Africa, and expanded from one branch in
Pietermaritzburg to 5 branches across the state during our study period (February 2008 through
July 2009). Opportunity offers small, high-interest, uncollateralised debt with a fixed monthly
repayment amount. Loans made during our study period averaged around 3500R ($US400), with
a modal (mean) duration of 9 (10) months, and a modal (mean) monthly percentage rate of 5%
(4.1%). There is a competitive market for these loans in Kwazulu Natal (see Karlan and Zinman
10Beaman and Magruder (2012) conduct a peer referral experiment in the labor market and use it to show the presence
of selection effects. They do not consider enforcement, nor the equivalent of selection on malleability.
11Recent work by Gunnsteinsson (2012) on crop insurance provides an example of how non-enforcement incentives can
be applied in other product markets.
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2010 for a description of a different lender in this market).
Opportunity underwrites applications using a combination of internal and external credit
scores (South Africa has well-functioning credit bureaus). A necessary condition for getting a
loan is a documented, steady, salaried job. The loans are not tied to a specific purpose, but bor-
rowers are asked the purpose of the loan and most report needing the money for paying school
fees for their children, attending/organizing a funeral, or purchasing a durable.
3 The Experiment
From February 2008 through July 2009, Opportunity offered each individual approved for a loan
the opportunity to participate in its new “Refer-A-Friend”program. Individuals could participate
in the program only once. Referrers received a referral card, which they could give to a friend
(the referred).12 The referred earned R40 ($US5) if she brought in the card and was approved
for a loan. The referrer could earn R100 ($US12)13 for referring someone who was subsequently
approved for and/or repaid a loan, depending on the referrer’s incentive contract.
Opportunity first randomly assigned referrers to one of two ex-ante incentive contracts, cor-
responding to two different referral cards. Referrers given an ex-ante approval incentive would
be paid only if the referred was approved for a loan.14 Referrers given the ex-ante repayment in-
centive would be paid only if the referred successfully repaid a loan.15 Figure 2 shows examples
of the referral cards, the top card was given to referrers in the ex-ante approval group and the
bottom card to those in the ex-ante repayment group.
Among the set of referrers whose referred friends were approved for a loan, Opportunity
randomly selected half to be surprised with an ex-post incentive change.
Among referrers who had been given the ex-ante approval incentive, half were assigned
to receive an additional ex-post repayment incentive.16 Opportunity phoned referrers in the
additional-incentive arm and told them that, in addition to the R100 approval bonus, they would
receive an additional R100 if the referred repaid the loan. Opportunity also phoned the other
half of referrers in the ex-ante approval incentive group– those who did not get the additional ex-
post repayment incentive– with a remninder to pick up their R100 bonus. The phone call did not
provide any new information on the incentive contract to this second arm, but we wanted every
referrer to get a call from Opportunity in case the personalized contact from the lender had some
12Note that each referrer received only one card. Had we given each referrer many cards we could have increased
power for the repayment experiment, but the lack of scarcity of cards to give out would have made it costless to make a
referral and thus removed the possibility of studying selection.
13The bonus for the referrer was initially R60 but was changed to R100 in July 2008 at the request of the lender. The
inclusion of this as a control makes no difference in any of our results.
14Because the bonus was conditional on approval there is the possibility that some referred clients were approved for a
loan and then did not take out a loan. This does not occur in the data.
15Successful repayment was defined as having no money owing on the date of maturity of the loan.
16This treatment design generates an additional difference between the treatment group and those receiving only the
ex-ante incentive: the referrer receives two payments. Each payment is equivalent to a about a days wage. As long as this
does not generate an income effect, it should not affect the interpretation of our results.
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Figure 2: Referral Cards
If the friend is approved for a loan
If the friend successfully repays a loan
effect. Importantly, while opportunity was aware of the assignment to treatment, no change was
made to the intensity of enforcement in response to the incentives, and individual staff members
responsible for enforcement action were not directly aware of the treatment assignment.
Among referrers who had been given the ex-ante repayment incentive, half of the referrers
were assigned to have the ex-post repayment incentive removed. Opportunity phoned referrers
in this arm, told them that they would be paid R100 now instead of conditional on loan repay-
ment, and explained that this was the extent of the referrer’s bonus eligibility (e.g., that the refer-
rer would not receive an additional R100 if the loan was repaid). The other half of referrers who
had been given the ex-ante repayment incentive were assigned to continue with an ex-post re-
payment incentive. Opportunity phoned these referrers with a reminder that they would receive
a bonus if the loan was repaid.
Figure 1 summarizes the randomization and the incentives that the referrers face. Intuitively,
any effect of peer screening can be identified by comparing the arms with and without an ex-ante
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repayment incentive, holding constant the ex-post incentive. Similarly, any effect of peer enforce-
ment can be identified by comparing the arms with and without an ex-post repayment incentive,
holding constant the ex-ante incentive. Two additional comparisons permit separate identifica-
tion of selection on repayment type and selection on enforcement malleability. First, comparing
repayment rates across columns only in the top row measures selection in the absence of an en-
forcement incentive. This comparison reveals the extent of selection on repayment type even if
repayment type and malleability are correlated. Second, the design produces two estimates of
the size of the enforcement effect, one with a selection incentive (comparing rows conditional
on being in the right column) and one without (comparing rows conditional on being in the left
column). Comparing these two estimates gives us a measure of selection on malleability.
4 Identification
In this section we provide a stylised model of the referral decision to help clarify the interpretation
of our experiment. We provide the simplest model possible to discuss the interaction between
selection on repayment type, selection on malleability, and enforcement. The purpose is not to
provide new theory or derive new predictions, but rather to formalize what can be identified by
the experimental treatments. In particular, we clarify the assumptions needed to interpret the
experiment as separating out selection and enforcement effects. We outline the basic model in
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 then relates the model to the data collected in the experiment. Section
4.3 interprets the different repayment rates induced by the experiment, giving formal definitions
of selection on repayment type and selection on malleability and then discussing how these are
identified by the experiment. Appendix B analyses the extent to which the experiment allows us
to determine whether referrers have information about their peers’ repayment types, even if the
lender also has this information.
4.1 The Referral Decision
A market consists of N potential borrowers (referreds), each of whom is characterised by four
parameters:
1. θ ∈ {θL, θH}: a repayment type;
2. σ ∈ {σL, σH}: a malleability type;
3. γ ∈ {γL,γH}: the probability that the individual is approved for a loan; and
4. λ ∈ (0, λ¯]: the net cost of recruiting the individual to the referral scheme, including all social
and search costs and/or benefits, but excluding the referral bonus.
We assume that these characteristics are drawn from a population distribution F, and allow for
characteristics to be correlated. In particular, it may be that repayment type is correlated with
9
Figure 3: Venn Diagram Showing the Distribution of Potential Referreds by Repayment Type (θ),







malleability; we discuss below how this would affect identification. We concentrate on the case
with binary types for ease of exposition.17 Figure 3 provides a simple diagram showing the poten-
tial distribution of repayment, malleability and approval types. It will be helpful in the discussion
below.18
We assume that referrer j knows the cost of referral λij19 and holds beliefs (θˆij, σˆij, γˆij) about
each potential referred i. We further assume that each of these beliefs is binary. So, for example,
θˆ ∈ {θˆL, θˆH}with the interpretation that θˆij = θˆH implies that referrer j believes potential referred
i to be a high repayment type.
The timing of the referral decision is as follows:
1. Referrer j chooses a referred i and pays a cost λij (or chooses not to make a referral);
2. The referred is approved for a loan with probability γi;
3. The referrer applies social pressure e to encourage repayment and incurs cost c(e), where c
is a strictly convex cost function;
4. The loan is repaid with probability θi + σije.20
17Allowing for more types does not alter the thrust of the arguments. However, we comment in the text where allowing
for a richer type space would lead to a slightly different interpretation.
18We leave out correlation with λ as this is assumed to be continuous and it leads to a very complicated diagram.
19This last assumption seems reasonable given that we assume the cost is paid prior to the referral. Beliefs could be
derived from a more primitive model in which the referrer has a prior belief about types, receives a signal and uses Bayes’
rule to form the beliefs (θˆij, σˆij, γˆij).
20σ is potentially specific to the referrer-referred match, and we allow for that in our notation.
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We assume that {θH , θL} and {σH , σL} are such that the probability of repayment always lies
between zero and one given an optimal effort choice. We could allow for a more complicated
repayment function without altering our discussion. An advantage of the linear form is that σ
encodes all the information needed to determine the impact of enforcement effort.
In making the referral decision, a referrer takes into account the possibility that she will exert
pressure on the referred to repay the loan. We therefore consider the decision backward, first
analysing the effort decision and then returning to the referral decision.
Consider first the effort decision. If the referrer is in the ex-ante approval treatment she knows
she will exert no effort. If the referrer is in the ex-ante repayment treatment she foresees choosing




BR(θˆ + σˆe)− c(e)
}
where BR is the bonus payment in the repayment treatment. We denote the unique maximiser
e∗(σˆ) which depends on θˆ only through a correlation between σˆ and θˆ. For a borrower of type
(θ, σ) perceived to be of type (θˆ, σˆ) the repayment probability is θ + σe∗(σˆ).
Now consider the referral decision. Given the effort decision discussed above, referrer j in the







where BA is the bonus paid in approval treatment. Because the bonus in the ex-ante approval
treatment is expected to arrive earlier in time (immediately after approval) BA ≥ BR. In the











Equation (2) makes clear that the selection decision depends on both the belief about repayment
type and the belief about malleability. Finally, the model is completed by noting that referrer j
makes a referral in the ex-ante repayment treatment if Uj(R) > 0 and in the approval treatment
if Uj(A) > 0.
4.2 Map from Model to Data
Our analysis focuses on the repayment behaviour of individuals referred under different referral
incentives. We denote the ex-ante (prior to referral being made) treatment assignment with a
lower case letter and the ex-post (after the referral is made) assignment with an upper case letter.
So, for example, E(λ|aR) is the expectation of λ conditional on the referrer being in the ex-ante
approval group and ex-post repayment group, while E(λ|a) is the expectation of λ conditional
on being in the ex-ante approval group, unconditional on ex-post treatment assignment.
We have two potential measures of selection. Define S(A) as the difference in repayment
11
probabilities across ex-ante treatments conditional on being in the ex-post approval treatment
(where there is no enforcement incentive). S(A) is given by the expression
S(A) = E(θ|rA & app)− E(θ|aA & app),
where app implies that the observation is conditional on the referred individual being approved
for a loan, and expectations are taken over the population of referrers. We can also define S(R) as
the same comparison conditional on being in the ex-post repayment treatment:
S(R) = E(θ + σe∗(σˆ)|rR & app)− E(θ + σe∗(σˆ)|aR & app).
We also have two potential measures of enforcement. We define
N(r) = E(θ + σe∗(σˆ)|rR & app)− E(θ|rA & app),
as the different in repayment rates across enforcement treatments conditional on the ex-ante re-
payment incentive. We can also define the equivalent measure conditional on being in the ex-ante
approval treatment
N(a) = E(θ + σe∗(σˆ)|aR & app)− E(θ|aA & app).
4.3 Identifying Selection and Enforcement
The identification of enforcement effects is straightforward if the ex-post treatment does not af-
fect the referral or approval decision. This is a reasonable assumption, and a testable one (Sec-
tion 5.2), given that the referral and approval decisions occur without the referrer or lender
staff knowing the ex-post treatment assignment. Under this assumption, repayment type can-
cels out of the expressions for both N(a) and N(r) so that N(a) = E(σe∗(σˆ)|aR & app) and
N(r) = E(σe∗(σˆ)|rR & app). Therefore each of the expressions provides an estimate of the extent
to which social pressure can encourage loan repayment: our experiment generates two estimates
of the peer enforcement effect. These estimates may differ if malleability differs across the ex-ante
treatments.
We now turn to identification of selection, focusing first on repayment type and then on mal-
leability.
Definition 1. [Selection on Repayment Type] We say that our repayment incentive induced selection on
repayment type if
E(θ|r & app) > E(θ|a & app).
That is, on average, the set of clients referred under the ex-ante repayment incentive, and subsequently
approved for a loan, are more likely to repay than those referred under the ex-ante approval incentive.
In terms of Figure 3 the probability of repayment conditional on approval is proportional to
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the number of referreds in areas X and Z (i.e. those that will be approved and have a high repay-
ment type) relative to area W and Y (i.e. those that will be approved, but have a low repayment
type). We denote this ratio XZ/WY. There is selection on repayment type if XZ/WY is larger
with the ex-ante repayment incentive than with the ex-ante approval incentive. We use average
repayment rates because they are relevant to the firms profitability and, therefore, its contract
design choice.21
We use S(A) to identify selection on repayment type, keeping in mind two issues. One is
whether S(A) identifies repayment type per se (Definition 1), given that referrers in the rA group
have incentives to refer borrowers with relatively high malleability and referral cost. Figure 3
illustrates the issue with respect to malleability: the ex-ante repayment incentive may not only
change the ratio XZ/WY, but also the ratios X/Z and W/Y. The key assumption under which
S(A) identifies selection on repayment type is that referrers in treatment group rA do not exert en-
forcement effort: given this assumption, the repayment probability is given by θH for referrers in
areas X and Z, and θL for those in areas W and Z, and the difference XZ/WZ captures differences
in repayment type.22 Note that S(A) itself does not reveal anything about other characteristics of
referreds besides repayment type. Below we discuss how we can use S(A) in conjunction with
S(R) to identify malleability. The second issue concerns the referrers intent. Suppose that refer-
rers make referrals solely on the basis of malleability type, but malleability type happens to be
positively correlated with repayment type. Definition 1 includes this kind of incidental selection;
even though it is unintentional on the referrers part, it is relevant for the lender and the lender
may intentionally design a contract to induce this kind of selection. The question of referrer in-
tent does highlight the distinction between identifying selection and identifying whether referrers
have information per se about repayment type. We pursue this distinction in Appendix B.
Turning to S(R), we now clarify that this comparison only identifies selection on repayment
type under stronger assumptions. Figure 3 illustrates that WX/YZ may be smaller in the ex-
ante repayment group indicating that this group has more high malleability types. Although this
would not affect S(A) because e = 0, it would affect S(R) where e 6= 0, both in theory and as
shown empirically below. If the effectiveness or extent of social pressure depends on the repay-
ment type (in our model this would occur through a correlation between repayment type and
malleability type) then S(R) could over- or under-estimate the extent of selection on repayment
type. Moreover, theory does not pin down the sign of the correlation between repayment type
and malleability. One intuition suggests that there is less scope for social pressure on those who
are predisposed to repay: corr(σˆ, θˆ) < 0 and corr(σ, θˆ) < 0 . So in this case high types would
be less malleable. Social pressure might even be counterproductive if high repayment types are
intrinsically motivated and external pressure crowds out intrinsic motivation (e.g. Gneezy and
21We condition on approval because the approval decision is necessary in credit (and insurance, and labor) markets. But
we need not condition on approval: the extent of selection on repayment type under our definition will be proportional to
the extent of selection on repayment type under the unconditional definition, so long as we are willing to assume that the
probability of approval is strictly increasing in repayment type. This seems like a reasonable assumption in most settings.
22Repayment probability is defined as θ + σeas discussed above. As a consequence when e = 0 the repayment proba-
bility is θ.
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Rustichini 2000, Benabou and Tirole 2003 & Besley and Ghatak 2005). A second intuition, how-
ever, suggests that high types will be more malleable; e.g., they already care the most about
repaying and hence will also care most about how they are viewed by their peers. If this is the
case we would expect that corr(σˆ, θˆ) > 0 and corr(σ, θˆ) > 0.23
We refer to this issue as the comparability problem because S(R) does not provide an apples-
to-apples comparison: the two groups potentially differ in the extent of social pressure and mal-
leability. The comparability problem occurs in settings where there is both hidden information,
and hidden action that could depend on the extent of hidden information.
We now consider selection on malleability.
Definition 2. [Selection on Malleability] We say that our incentive induced positive (negative) selection
on malleability if
E(σe∗(σˆ)|rR & app) > (<)E(σe∗(σˆ)|aR & app).
That is, on average the set of clients referred under the ex-ante repayment incentive, and subsequently
approved for a loan, are more (less) susceptible to the chosen social pressure of their referrer than those
referred under the ex-ante approval incentive.
In terms of Figure 3 we say that there is selection on malleability if YZ/WX depends on
the treatment assignment.24 We condition on the optimal choice of social pressure in the ex-
post repayment treatment. An alternative would be to define positive (negative) selection on
malleability to be
E(σ|r & app) > (<)E(σ|a & app).
This may seem a more natural definition, but a more malleable set of referrers is not helpful to
the lender if the referrers do not in fact put the appropriate pressure on these referrers.
Again assuming that the ex-post treatment does not affect the referral or approval decision we
have
S(R)− S(A) = E(σe∗(σˆ)|rR & app)− E(σe∗(σˆ)|aR & app).
Therefore, S(R)− S(A) > (<)0 implies positive (negative) selection on malleability.25
In Appendix B we use the model to show that if E(λ|r) > E(λ|a), so that the cost of referrals in
the ex-ante repayment treatment is higher than in the ex-ante approval treatment, and S(A) = 0
23In the more familiar setting of moral hazard and adverse selection in the credit market, Karlan and Zinman (2009)
provide a simple model that implies high types put more effort into ensuring project success. If that model is true,
correlation between hidden information and the extent of hidden action would tend to lead to an underestimate of the
extent of selection on risk type. Even in that case, however, it is possible to tweak the simple model and reverse the
comparative static. The extent and direction of these interaction effects is, therefore, an empirical matter.
24As above, we condition on approval and look at average repayment rates as we believe that this is the most appropri-
ate measure when considering how to design contracts.
25There is a meaningful distinction between intentional and incidental selection on malleability if referrers are not
forward-looking or do not actually have a good signal of malleability type. Although these contingencies seems unlikely
to arise, we note two points. First, it is the possiblity of incidental selection on malleability– in particular of high repayment
types being less malleable– that leads to the possibility of negative selection on malleability. Second, observing S(A) < 0
and S(R) > 0 is only possible if there is positive intentional selection on malleability, and if selection on repayment type
and selection on malleability are substitutes.
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then we can infer that referrers do not have information about repayment type, conditional on
the information used by the lender for approval. The intuition is simple: if the referral is more
costly in the ex-ante repayment group, then we can infer that referrers tried to chose someone
who is likely to repay. But if S(A) = 0, there is no effect of the referrers’ selection, and we can
infer that referrers failed in their attempt to screen on repayment type. Appendix B clarifies some
additional assumptions required to complete the argument.
5 Data
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of potential referrers over the period in which
the experiment was run.
Table 1: Demographic Variables of all Borrowers During Experiment
Mean Median Std Dev
Female 0.418 - 0.493
Age 37.789 36.000 10.785
High School Education 0.637 - 0.481
Disposable Income 1753 1265 1703
Requested Amount 5049 3000 6615
Requested Term 10.743 9 6.265
(Months)
N 4408
Disposable income is monthly income remaining after rent, debt repayments and recurring obligations. It is measured in
Rand. An individual has a high school education if they have matriculated or gone on to tertiary education.
5.2 Integrity of the Randomization
Opportunity handed out 4408 referral cards to potential referrers– borrowers approved for new
loans– during the study period.26 Table 2 presents regressions of treatment assignment on referrer
characteristics at baseline. If the randomization is valid, we would expect these characteristics to
be uncorrelated with treatment. In all cases an F-test of the restriction that the coefficients are
26Referred clients were not eligible for a card. This restriction was aimed to reduce learning about the treatments among
potential referreds.
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jointly zero fails to reject at the usual significance levels. Further, most individual coefficients are
not statistically different from zero and the total number of significant coefficients is in line with
what we would expect to see by chance. Below we also show that our treatment effect estimates
are robust to including controls for referrer baseline characteristics. Finally, our main significant
result is a large enforcement effect: this is unlikely to be driven by the imbalance as a lower
application score for those in the repayment treatment would suggest a lower ability to repay.
Of the 4408 cards that were handed out, 430 were returned and 245 of these referred clients
were approved for a loan. The surprise nature of the second randomization (i.e. the change
in ex-post incentives) provides another opportunity to check the integrity of the experimental
implementation. Because the second-stage assignments were not known to potential referrers ex-
ante (nor to Opportunity staff members delivering referral cards), baseline characteristics of those
referred and approved for a loan27 should not differ within the ex-post treatment groups.28 Table
3 presents tests this hypothesis from regressions where the outcome variable is being assigned to
the ex-post repayment incentive.
Within the group given the ex-ante approval incentive (Table 3 Column 1), the F-test shows
that the baseline coefficients do not significantly predict assignment to treatment in the joint test.
Among the individual tests, only one of the sixteen variables is significant, which is about what
one would expect to happen by chance.
Within the group given the ex-ante repayment incentive (Column 2), a higher application
score (i.e., internal credit score) significantly predicts assignment to the ex-post approval group.
Given that application score is a key measure of the observed credit quality of the applicant, this
is troubling. It turns out that Opportunity changed its application score in May 2009 (before this
time, scores are out of 200, while after they are out of 800). Only 12 referred clients from the ex-
ante repayment group were approved for loans after the change, with 9 coming from the ex-post
approval group. This is not out of line with what we would expect from random arrival times, but
it does create a problem in testing orthogonality. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 take two approaches.
Column 3 omits the application score, and the p-value for the F-test of joint significance rises to
0.326 (from 0.077 in Column 2). Column 4 drops the 12 post-change observations (so the sample
size falls from 120 to 108), and the p-value is 0.478. We also note that the ITC (external) credit
score– which is provided by a credit bureau and is another key predictor of credit worthiness– is
never predictive of treatment status.
Overall it seems that the randomization was successful. We also show below that our results
are not sensitive to including these baseline characteristics as controls.29
27Results are similar if we do not condition on approval, and instead consider the full sample of 430 referreds.
28Comparison across the ex-ante incentive groups are, however, endogenous. That is, we cannot compare characteristics
of those in the ex-ante approval groups to those in the ex-ante repayment groups because the experiment aims to generate
difference in these characteristics.
29We can only control for these differences when studying the enforcement question; when we consider selection,
referred characteristics are endogenous.
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Table 2: Testing The Balance of Referrer Characteristics Across Treatments: OLS
Ex-Ante Incentive
Ex-Post Incentive Approval Repayment Approval Repayment
Female -0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High School Education -0.027 0.027 -0.007 0.008
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Salary Earner -0.004 0.022 -0.016 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Disposable Income -0.003 -0.006 0.010* -0.001
(Thousands of Rand) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)*
Application Score 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ITC Score 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ITC Score Missing 0.072 0.039 -0.058 -0.053
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110)
Requested Amount -0.001 0.004* -0.004* 0.000
(Thousands of Rand) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)* *
Requested Term 0.002 -0.004* 0.002 0.000
(Months) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)*
Government Worker 0.005 -0.002 0.022 -0.025
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Cleaner/Builder/Miner 0.010 -0.006 0.007 -0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Security/Mining/Transport 0.021 -0.004 0.020 -0.037
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Retail Worker -0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.009
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
IT/Financial Woker 0.010 -0.025 0.014 0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Agriculture/Manufacturing 0.008 -0.005 0.027 -0.030
-0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
Constant 0.189 0.224 0.273** 0.315*
(0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120)
F-test of joint significance 0.560 0.930 0.810 0.440
p-value of F-test 0.916 0.533 0.679 0.971
N 4408 4408 4408 4408
Approval Repayment
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Each column represents a separate OLS regression where the LHS variable is assignment to
the particular treatment. Education is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the referrer has matriculated. Application score is an internal
credit score. ITC score is external credit score. Salary monthly is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the client receives his or her salary
monthly.
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Table 3: Testing The Balance of Referred Characteristics Across Ex-post Treatments. Dependent





Ex-Ante Incentive Approval Repayment Repayment Repayment
Female 0.041 0.098 0.088 0.147
(0.113) (0.104) (0.107) (0.113)
Age 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
High School Education 0.131 0.022 -0.005 -0.008
(0.148) (0.164) (0.169) (0.173)
Salary Earner 0.029 -0.117 -0.086 -0.106
(0.110) (0.113) (0.116) (0.133)
Disposable Income 0.034 0.028 0.037 0.023
(Thousands of Rand) (0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.069)
Application Score/100 0.016 -0.071*** - 0.020
(0.000) (0.000) - (0.004)**
ITC Score 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ITC Score Missing 1.197 -0.116 -0.276 -0.077
(0.893) (0.895) (0.922) (0.935)
Requested Amount 0.010 -0.027* -0.026 -0.020
(Thousands of Rand) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Requested Term -0.013 0.014 0.010 0.012
(Months) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Government Worker -0.389 0.103 0.023 0.115
(0.266) (0.257) (0.264) (0.273)
Cleaner/Builder/Miner -0.094 0.098 0.028 0.027
(0.207) (0.211) (0.217) (0.225)
Security/Mining/Transport -0.330 -0.321 -0.450* -0.355
(0.226) (0.251) (0.255) (0.275)
Retail Worker -0.212 -0.105 -0.166 -0.129
(0.203) (0.220) (0.226) (0.231)
IT/Financial Woker -0.570** 0.495 0.445 0.427
(0.279) (0.533) (0.550) (0.562)*
Agriculture/Manufacturing -0.222 -0.168 -0.214 -0.199
-0.187 -0.222 -0.229 -0.234
Constant -0.547 0.642 0.692 0.348
(0.923) (0.932) (0.962) (1.059)
F-test of joint significance 0.810 1.640 1.150 0.990
p-value of F-test 0.669 0.077* 0.326 0.47812
N 123 120 120 108
Whole Sample
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Each column represents a separate OLS regression where the LHS variable is assignment to
the particular treatment. Education is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the referrer has matriculated. Application score is an internal




6.1 Who Refers and Who Gets Referred?
430 of 4408, or 10%, of eligible clients made a referral. Making a referral is not correlated with
the ex-ante incentive: a regression of the referral rate on a dummy for ex-ante treatment gives a
coefficient of−0.002 with a standard error of 0.040. This suggests that the higher net present value
of the bonus in the ex-ante approval group was not an important consideration in the referrers’
calculations and did not induce greater search. And it bodes well for using the assumption that
E(λ|a) < E(λ|r) to help identify whether referrers have information (see Appendix B).
We also collected data on the relationship between referrers and referreds. Specifically, the
lender asked the referred “How do you know the person that gave you the voucher?” 426 of
our referreds answered this question, and most stated that the referrer was a relative or work
colleague. A small number answered church. Table 4 shows the results from a multinomial logit
of the impact of being in the ex-ante repayment group on the likelihood of referring a co-worker
or someone from the same church, relative to referring a family member. The table shows that
the selection incentive leads referrers to substitute away from relatives toward those they know
through church and their work colleagues.
We argue that this finding implies that E(λ|r) > E(λ|a). First, we believe that it is intuitive
that colleagues and co-religionists are more costly to refer than family members. This is both be-
cause colleagues may be harder to approach and because there may be a positive obligation to
refer family members given the R40 bonus given to the referred. Second, Beaman and Magruder
(2012) find similar substitution toward referring colleagues in a labor market experiment in In-
dia. Their experiment also documents that referred colleagues are more productive workers than
referred family members, which would only occur if colleagues are indeed more costly to refer.
Consequently, following our analysis in Appendix B, if we can now show that S(R) = S(A) and
S(A) = 0 we will infer that referrers have no information.
We also find evidence that referred clients are more likely to be approved for a loan. Approval
rate for clients off-the-street is around 23%, but for clients referred through the Refer-A-Friend
program the approval rate is around 55%. We will argue below that referrers were not success-
ful in selecting on repayment type. The observation that referred clients are more likely to be
approved is, therefore, consistent with two interpretations: i) peers know which of their friends
are creditworthy, but this information duplicates information already held by the lender; and ii)
peers have correlated credit scores and, because the referrers were all approved borrowers, their
peers are more likely to be approved than an average client.30 These two possibilities make it
hard to give a causal interpretation to the correlation.
30It is also possible that the lender took into account whether the borrower was referred in making its approval de-
cision. We find this unlikely for two reasons. First, the approval process is quite mechanical. Second, the lender was
genuinely agnostic as to whether the referral system would work. This was one of the main reasons for implementing the
experiment.
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Table 4: The Impact of Ex-ante Treatment Group on Referred Characteristics: Multinomial Logit,
Compared to Referring a Relative
Same Church Co-Worker
Ex-Ante 1.023** 0.434*




∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Results from a multinomial logit. Ommitted category is referral of a relative. Standard errors
in parentheses.
6.2 Measuring Repayment Performance
We identify screening and enforcement effects by comparing the repayment performance of loans
referred by referrers facing different incentives. We have four different and complementary mea-
sures of repayment performance. Each proxies for the costs a lender bears when borrowers don’t
repay (on time), without needing to impose additional assumptions on what the lender’s cost
structure actually is (since in our experience many lenders lack precise data on marginal costs of
collections). First, we have an indicator variable, for all 245 referred clients, of whether or not
the borrower was charged penalty interest for paying late at any time during the course of the
loan. Second, we measure whether the loan was fully repaid on the date of maturity for the 240
loans that have reached maturity. Third, for those 240 loans we also calculate the proportion of
principal still owed at maturity date (this value is zero for loans repaid on time, and positive for
loans in arrears). Fourth, Opportunity charges off loans deemed unrecoverable and has made a
chargeoff decision (yes or no) on all but one of the 240 loans that have reached maturity as of this
writing.31
Each panel in Table 5 shows the mean of these four loan performance measures, organized
by treatment groups. It also shows the difference in means holding either the ex-ante or ex-post
incentive fixed. These differences are our key results. Relating these back to Section 4.2 the right
most cell in the top row of each table gives S(A), the right most cell in the second row gives S(R)
the bottom cell in the first column gives N(a) and the second column gives N(r). Finally, the
bottom right cell in each table gives |S(R)− S(A)|.
31The results do not change qualitatively if we arbitrarily assign this loan as being charged off or not.
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Table 5: Key Outcome Variables: Mean Differences Across Treatment Groups












































































































∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected payment.
A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses and p-values
in square brackets. p-values are for a χ2-test of the hypothesis that the difference in differences is equal to zero. Ex-ante incentive is the
incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced after the loan had
been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan had to be repaid
in order to earn the bonus.
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6.3 Enforcement Effects
Table 5 provides eight estimates of the peer enforcement effect, two for each measure of default.
The bottom cell in the first column of each sub-table shows an estimate of N(a) and the bottom
cell in the second column shows an estimate of N(r). The point estimate for each of the eight
differences is negative, suggesting that adding the ex-post repayment incentive decreases the
incidence of default. Five of the eight estimates are statistically significant from zero, despite our
small sample.
In each case the implied magnitude of the enforcement effect is large; e.g., an 11 percentage
point reduction in chargeoff likelihood, on a base of 16%. The size of the impacts is also large
given the size of the bonus (R100) and the average loan size. It seems unlikely that these results
could be driven by referrers transferring R100 to the referred to encourage repayment. In all, the
results suggest that the small referral incentive created social pressure that led to large reductions
in default.
It is interesting to ask how the size of the effect compares to the impact of an incentive given
directly to the borrower – rather than to a peer. While we do not have the ideal data, we do have
one bit of evidence from a similar context with which to do a back of the envelope calculation.
Karlan and Zinman (2009) conducted a dynamic incentive experiment with a similar, although
much larger, South African lender in 2004. That intervention is somewhat different in that the
dynamic incentive did not come in the form of a cash bonus, but rather in the form of a reduced
rate on a future loan. On average, the dynamic incentive reduced the interest rate on a future
loan by 3.85% and led to a roughly 2.5% point increase in likelihood that the current loan was
paid on time. This result suggests that to have a similar impact as our study, a direct incentive
would need to be very large - in the order of a 12 percentage point reduction in the interest rate
(effectively making the interest rate on the next loan zero). This again suggests that at least part of
the enforcement effect in our experiment reflects social pressure, rather than simply the transfer
of cash from the referrer to the borrower.
6.4 Selection Effects
Table 5 also provides eight estimates of the peer selection effect, two for each measure of default.
Relating these back to Section 4.2, the rightmost cell in the top row of each table gives S(A), and
the rightmost cell in the second row gives S(R). Each of the eight point estimates is statistically
insignificant and positive, so there is no evidence that a small referral incentive induces screening
on repayment type that reduces default. In fact, if we take the point estimates seriously they
imply negative selection on repayment type. This outcome is consistent with our model if there is
strong intentional positive selection on malleability. As discussed in Section 4.3, this could lead
to the crowding out of the incentive to select on repayment type.
The bottom-right cell in each panel of Table 5 estimates the difference-in-differences (DD)
across the two different estimates of the referral incentive effects on default rates. Recall from
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Section 4 that if S(A) = S(R) we can rule out selection on malleability. A zero estimate of the
DD indicates that malleability is uncorrelated with ex-ante repayment type. And indeed none of
the four estimates is significantly different than zero. This suggests that, in our setting, selection
on malleability and the comparability problem are not that important. It bears emphasizing,
however, that these are very imprecisely estimated zeros: each of the four confidence intervals
includes economically large selection on malleability.
The DD estimate and the estimates of the selection effect are also relevant to determining
whether referrers have information. In Section (6.1) we argued that E(λ|r) > E(λ|a). This as-
sumption, following the analysis of Appendix B, in combination with the findings above that
S(A) = 0 and S(R)− S(A) = 0, suggest that referrers have no useful information for the lender
(again subject to the above mentioned caveats on the distribution of repayment types and our
wide confidence intervals). While this result should not be over interpreted (it requires quite
strong assumptions) it is worth noting that the alternative approach to measuring whether peo-
ple have information - getting people to bet on the loan performance of their friends - will not
allow for the removal of enforcement effects.
6.5 Improving Precision and Checking Robustness
Under the assumption that malleability is uncorrelated with repayment type, which is born out
by the above DD estimates, our model implies that we can estimate the extent of peer enforcement
and selection with greater precision, using regressions that pool across all four treatment arms:
yi = α+ β1en f orcei + β2selecti + ei
where yi is one of the four measures of default, en f orcei is an indicator with value 1 if client i was
referred by someone with the ex-post repayment incentive, and selecti is an indicator with value
1 if the client was referred by someone with the ex-ante repayment incentive. Results from this
regression (without controls) are presented in Table 6. For each of the four outcome measures we
see a large and statistically significant reduction in default associated with the enforcement in-
centive, and a smaller and statistically insignificant increase in default coming from the selection
incentive. These results sharpen the key inferences from the means comparisons in Table 5: there
is a large enforcement effect, and no (or a perverse) selection effect.
Appendix A shows that these results are robust to various specifications that control for the
baseline characteristics of borrowers or referrers.
7 Alternative Explanations and Other Considerations
In this section we discuss alternative interpretations of the results.
23













Enforcement -0.188*** -0.094* -0.129** -0.100**
(0.061) (0.049) (0.054) (0.042)
Selection 0.067 0.039 0.050 0.040
(0.060) (0.047) (0.052) (0.041)
Constant 0.419*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.149***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.046) (0.039)
N 245 240 240 239
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected payment.
A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses. Ex-ante incentive
is the incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced after the loan
had been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan had to be
repaid in order to earn the bonus.
7.1 Income Effects
In theory, the enforcement effect could be driven by side-payments from the referrer to referred
that produce an income effect on loan repayment. In practice this channel seems implausible, for
several reasons. First, the bonus was not paid out until after the loan was repaid, and the borrow-
ers in our sample are liquidity constrained (as evidenced by the fact that they are borrowing at
high rates). Second, even our smaller point estimates imply default reductions that seem too large
(about R500 on the average loan) to be explained by a small increase in income (maximum R100).
Third, as discussed above (Section 6.3), the enforcement effects here are large in comparison to
effects from bonuses paid directly to the borrower.
7.2 Signaling
The repayment rates in Table 5 consistently show that the highest default rates occur for those
clients who were in the ex-ante repayment group and moved to the ex-post approval group. In
this treatment group, Opportunity phoned the referrer and told her that the bonus would no
longer be paid upon repayment. It is possible that this signaled that the lender was not really
interested in repayment. If this explanation is correct, then our estimate of selection conditional
on being in the ex-post approval group would be biased in favor of showing no screening, while
our estimate of enforcement conditional on the ex-ante repayment incentive would be biased in
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favor of finding an enforcement effect.
Although we cannot completely rule out the lender perversely signaled referrers in the rA
arm, three factors suggest that it is not a first-order concern. First, recall that we can estimate
the enforcement effect and selection effect without relying on the rA arm. Second, recall that our
estimates of selection and enforcement effects do not actually differ whether we use the rA arm or
not: we do not find any evidence, statistically speaking, that estimates using the rA arm are any
different, as they would need to be to be biased. (This inference is of course subject to the caveat
that our confidence intervals are wide and hence any null result in this paper does not rule out
large differences). Third, if the signaling story were correct the repayment rates for the referrer
would also be affected, since the referred would only receive the perverse signal through the
referrer (the lender does not directly provide the borrower with any information about referral
incentives). But the difference between the default rates of the “signaled” and the “un-signaled”
is not significantly different from zero for any of the four default measures ( −0.060 (p = 0.414),
−0.030 (p = 0.473), −0.019 (p = 0.664) and −0.006 (p = 0.895)): the data does not support the
signaling story. If anything the point estimates suggest that the “signaled” were better repayers.
7.3 Impatience
Referrers who were assigned to the ex-ante repayment incentive were promised a bonus that
would not be paid until the referrer repaid their loans. One might therefore expect fewer referrers
to make a referral in this treatment group, and/or that those making referrals would be more
patient (and hence be more willing to and effective at enforcing loans). Either difference could,
in principle, create issues for the identification of screening effects. In practice, such issues do not
matter much. First, the number of referred clients does not differ across the ex-ante treatment
groups (99 in the ex-ante approval group v. 94 in the ex-ante repayment group, p = 0.516).
Second, if referrers in the ex-ante repayment group were more patient and this impacted on how
much social pressure they placed on their referreds, then we would expect to see evidence for
this in the size of the enforcement effect; i.e., estimates using the ex-ante repayment group should
show larger effects As discussed above, there is no evidence for this, albeit with large confidence
intervals.
7.4 Reputation and Other Considerations
Most borrowers probably see themselves in an ongoing relationship with the lender. They may,
therefore, value their reputation with the lender and this may give an incentive to enforce the loan
even if they did not receive an ex-post repayment incentive. This could have two effects. First, it
may weaken our ability to identify enforcement effects if the proportional effect of reputation on
enforcement is larger in the ex-post approval than than the ex-post repayment arms. This is not a
major concern in the current implementation, given that we find large enforcement effects in spite
of any downward bias. Second, it could reduce our ability to identify selection effects if the effect
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of reputation on screening is proportionally larger in the ex-ante approval than the ex-ante repay-
ment arms. This would occur, for example, if reputation effects imply that all referrers engage in
the maximal amount of selection. But, the fact that we see referrers move toward referring work
mates in response to the selection incentive suggests that our incentive was effective in inducing
an attempt at screening so we believe that the reputation effect cannot have been too strong.
Another issue arises because of the asymmetry of the incentives when comparing across ex-
ante incentive holding fixed the ex-post repayment incentive - i.e. comparison S(R). In this
case, those in the aR group have already received a payment from the lender when they consider
enforcement, while those that are in the rR group have not. This may mean that those in the aR
group believe more strongly in the lender’s willingness to pay, and may have a larger incentive
to enforce. This effect will tend to lead us to underestimate any selection effect when using the
comparison S(R). This logic will not, however, affect the validity of the S(A) comparison as a
measure of selection on repayment type, but will weaken our ability to use the difference S(R)−
S(A) as a measure of selection on malleability.
A related issue arises from the timing difference in the offer of ex-ante and ex-post repayment
incentives. Referrers in the rR group are notified of their incentive earlier than those in the aR
group and may thus engage in different kinds of enforcement (e.g., influencing their referred’s
project choice). If this makes enforcement more effective in rR than aR, then S(R) we will over-
estimate selection effects. But the impact of this potential bias is mitigated by the fact that we
can and do use S(A) instead of S(R) to identify selection on repayment type. Note also that in
practice we do not find statistically significant selection effects, meaning than any overestimation
using S(R) is not producing a false positive, at least in our setting.
8 Conclusions
We formalize and implement a field experiment design and show it is possible to identify peer
selection and peer enforcement effects separately, even when peers select on malleablity to en-
forcement pressure. Novel features of the design include experimental arms without enforcement
incentives (see also Gunnsteinsson (2012)), combinations of experimental arms that produce dif-
ferent estimates of selection and enforcement effects, and a combination that estimates the extent
of selection on hidden action (malleability). We hope that our analysis of identification will pave
the way for further progress in identifying interactions between hidden information and hidden
action, using multi-stage experiments as well as other methods.
Our empirical results imply large peer enforcement effects. They also imply peer selection that
is only partly effective: peers refer applicants who are likely to be approved, but do not end up
producing any ex-ante information on repayment type that is useful to the lender on the margin
(despite evidence suggesting that they exert at least some effort to select better repayment types).
Both theory and practice suggest that results may be different elsewhere – e.g., in settings
that lack a well-functioning credit bureau, or with contracts that use larger referral bonuses – and
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hence our experiment is designed to be portable. Our experiment can be layered on top of any
individual liability lending operation, and could be modified to work with joint liability lending.
Given the implications for increased profits for the lender, the results from our demonstration
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A Robustness to Controls
We now check whether the results are robust to adding controls. We start by estimating the
enforcement or screening effect separately using equations of the form:
yi = αi + βTi + γXi + ei, (3)
where yi is again a measure of default, Ti is a dummy variable which takes on value 1 if i is
“treated”, and Xi is a set of controls for either referrer or borrower baseline characteristics (these
sets of characteristics are highly collinear). When estimating the enforcement effect here, Ti = 1
if the referrer was given the ex-post repayment incentive. We condition on the ex-ante incentive
by running regressions separately for the samples that received the ex-ante approval incentive
(Tables A.1 and A.2, Panel (a)) or the ex-ante repayment incentive (Panel (b)). When controlling
for the referred’s application score we include a dummy variable for whether the client came in
after the change in application score procedure and also interact that term with the application
score. Tables A.1 and A.2 show that adding controls does not alter the coefficients appreciably.
To test for selection effects we repeat the above exercise with Ti being an indicator for whether
the referrer was given an ex-ante repayment incentive. The results are reported in Table A.3.
In Panel (a) we restrict the sample to those given the ex-post approval incentive and in Panel
(b) we restrict the sample to those given the ex-post repayment incentive. For these regressions
we control for referrer characteristics as the referred characteristics are endogenous. Again, the
results are robust to including controls.
Finally, we again pool the data and assume that the enforcement and selection effects are
independent of each other. That is we run the regression
yi = α+ β1en f orcei + β2selecti + β3Xi + ei
where Xi is a set of controls. In this case we can only control for referrer characteristics as once
again the referred characteristics are endogenous. Table A.4 contains the results, which do not
differ significantly from those reported in Table 6 without controls.
B Do Referrers Have Information?
The discussion in the text shows what is identified by the the experiment. In this section we ar-
gue that we can use the experiment to understand whether referrers have information regarding
repayment types. This is a more general question than asking whether there is selection on repay-
ment type. For example, if we see no selection on repayment type it may be that referrers have
information, but the experiment did not lead them to reveal that information. We will argue in
this section and the empirical work that follows that the experiment did lead referrers to attempt
to select high repayment types, but that this selection was (subject to power considerations) un-
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successful. We interpret this as evidence that referrers in fact have no useful information – at least
that can be extracted with incentives of the size we use. From a contract design perspective, this
means that our experiment can be useful in ruling out a whole class of mechanisms, rather than
just implying that our particular example is not effective in inducing selection.
Definition 3. [Referrer Knowledge] We say that referrers have information about repayment type if
E(θ|θˆ = θˆH & app) > E(θ|θˆ = θˆL & app). (4)
As with the definitions of selection in the main text, this statement is conditional on loan
approval: we are interested in whether referrers have information that predicts repayment above
and beyond the information that the lender observes.
Inferring whether referrers have information can, but need not, be straightforward. If S(A) >
0 it must be that the referrers have information about repayment type. But if S(A) ≤ 0 it is not
immediately clear whether referrers have information. It may be that referrers have information,
but that they have not been induced to reveal it. For example, our model allows for the possibility
that referrers believe approval types γˆ and repayment types θˆ to be highly correlated. In this case
there may be no differential incentive to refer high types in the ex-ante repayment treatment.
Alternatively, because BA ≥ BR referrers in the ex-ante approval treatment may be willing to
pay a higher cost λ to make a referral. If λ is correlated with repayment type we may even see
S(A) < 0, but this would not necessarily show a lack of information. Finally, it could just be that
referrers tend to only have one potential referred.
We argue that if E(λ|r) > E(λ|a), S(A) = 0, S(R) = S(A) and σˆ is positively correlated with
σ, then we can infer that referrers do not have information. To see this note that we can write
S(A) ≡ Pr(θˆ = θˆH |r)E(θ|θˆH & app) + (1− Pr(θˆ = θˆH |r))E(θ|θˆL & app)
−
(
Pr(θˆ = θˆH |a)E(θ|θˆH & app) + (1− Pr(θˆ = θˆH |a))E(θ|θˆL & app)
)
.
Consequently, if the experiment induces selection in the sense that
Pr(θˆ = θˆH |r) > Pr(θˆ = θˆH |a), (SELECTION)
then S(A) = 0 implies that referrers have no information. To complete the argument we need to
show that E(λ|r) > E(λ|a) and S(R)− S(A) = 0 imply SELECTION.





BR(θˆ + σe∗(σˆ))− c(e∗(σˆ))
)|r) > E(γˆ(BR(θˆ + σe∗(σˆ))− c(e∗(σˆ)))|a). (5)
This follows because there must be some expected return to making a high cost referral. Condition
(5), combined with the assumption that c is strictly convex, then implies that E(θˆ + σe∗(σ)|r) >
E(θˆ + σe∗(σ)|a): that the ex-ante incentive induced selection on the probability of repayment
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conditional on anticipated effort. To complete the argument, observe that if S(R) = S(A) then
E(θˆ + σe∗(σ)|r) > E(θˆ + σe∗(σ)|a) implies E(θˆ|r) > E(θˆ|a) so long as we are willing to make the
weak assumption that σˆ is positively correlated with σ: that those perceived to be more malleable
are, in reality, more malleable.
Finally, it is worth noting that our restriction to two repayment types may be restrictive in the
case where S(A) = 0. Our experiment provides a limited incentive (BR) to refer a good repayment
type. It may be that this incentive induces SELECTION within a set of low-cost referreds, and
that a larger incentive would induce selection across a larger group of potential referreds. For
example, it may be that the referrers know people who are high repayment types, but that it is
very costly to contact them and make the referral.
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Table A.1: Enforcement Effects. The Impact of Ex-post Repayment Incentive Within Ex-ante Treat-
ment Group: OLS with Controls for Referrer Characteristics










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
-0.144 -0.188** -0.184** -0.166**
(0.097) (0.084) (0.084) (0.068)











Controls All All All All
N 125 121 121 121
Ex-Post 
Repayment










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
-0.208* -0.115 -0.157* -0.128*
(0.107) (0.084) (0.091) (0.076)











Controls All All All All
N 120 117 117 117
Ex-Post 
Repayment
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected payment.
A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses. Ex-ante incentive
is the incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced after the
loan had been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan had
to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls: Female, Age, Disposable Income, Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, ITC
Score, Job Type, Requested Loan Amount, Requested Term, Branch, Application Month, Application year. All controls are for referrer
characteristics. Categorical variables are entered as fixed effects.
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Table A.2: Enforcement Effects. The Impact of Ex-post Repayment Incentive Within Ex-ante Treat-
ment Group: OLS with Controls for Referred Characteristics










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
-0.100** -0.127** -0.120** -0.115**
(0.034) (0.045) (0.039) (0.046)











Controls All All All All
N 125 121 121 121
Ex-Post 
Repayment










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
-0.312** -0.072* -0.066 -0.098*
(0.095) (0.033) (0.040) (0.046)











Controls All All All All
N 120 119 119 118
Ex-Post 
Repayment
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected
payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses. Ex-ante
incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced
after the loan had been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan
had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls: Female, Age, Disposable Income, Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score,
Application Score Post May 2009, ITC Score, Job Type, Requested Loan Amount, Requested Term, Branch, Application Month, Application
year. All controls are for referrer characteristics. Categorical variables are entered as fixed effects.
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Table A.3: Selection Effects. The Impact of Ex-ante Repayment Incentive Within Ex-post Treat-
ment Group: OLS with Controls










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
0.046 0.046 0.035 0.027
(0.041) (0.035) (0.041) (0.031)











Controls All All All All
N 113 111 111 111
Ex-Ante 
Repayment










Approval Left Out Left Out Left Out Left Out
0.007 0.009 0.018 0.028 
(0.100) (0.080) (0.075) (0.063)











Controls All All All All
N 132 129 129 128
Ex-Ante 
Repayment
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected payment.
A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses. Ex-ante incentive
is the incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced after the
loan had been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan had
to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls: Female, Age, Disposable Income, Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, Job
Type, Requested Loan Amount, Requested Term, Branch, Application Month, Application year. All controls are for referrer characteristics.
Categorical variables are entered as fixed effects.
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Table A.4: Pooled Impact of Selection and Enforcement Treatments on Key Outcome Variables:












Enforcement -0.168*** -0.117** -0.130** -0.109**
(0.065) (0.055) (0.054) (0.047)
Selection -0.009 0.021 0.018 0.032











Controls All All All All
N 245 240 240 239
∗∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗∗ ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗ ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty interest is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in making an expected
payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that there is no probability that it will be repaid. Standard errors in parentheses. Ex-ante
incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced when choosing a friend to refer. Ex-post incentive is the incentive that the referrer faced
after the loan had been approved. Approval implies the loan had to be approved in order to earn the bonus and repayment implies the loan
had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls: Female, Age, Disposable Income, Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score,
ITC score, Job Type, Requested Loan Amount, Requested Term, Branch, Application Month, Application year. All controls are for referrer
characteristics. Categorical variables are entered as fixed effects.
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